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I. Introduction
A. Basic Nature of Problem
The typical Japanese joint venture corporation will usually be formed by one
Japanese and one foreign corporation, with the total shares of the joint venture
corporation divided between them. Although this type of enterprise could easily
be organized as a Japanese limited liability corporation (yfigen gaisha),'
primarily for psychological and sociological reasons that form is invariably
rejected in favor of incorporation as a stock corporation (kabushiki
kaisha-k.k.).2 Thus, as in the close corporation situation under the typical
American corporation statute, the interests of the parties must be accom-
modated through use of a corporate form intended primarily for enterprises
with much more complex ownership interests. In both countries it is necessary
to fashion appropriate devices to protect these interests despite use of the rather
cumbersome structure of the corporate law.
Devices used to accommodate the interests of the parties involved in a
*LL.M. (1972), Asian Law Program, and J.D. (1971), Univ. of Washington School of Law; B.A.
(magna cum laude, 1956), Univ. of Washington; member, Washington State Bar; visiting lecturer in
law, Univ. of Washington School of Law (1972-1974); Foreign Service Officer, United States
Department of State (1959-1968).
'Yigen gaishah5 (Limited company law) (Law No. 74, 1938), in 2 EHS No. 2230).
'The Japanese equivalent of our state corporation statutes is a part of their Commercial Code.
The part applicable specifically to stock corporations is Commercial Code arts. 165-456. Regarding
rejection of the limited liability corporation form, see Henderson, Contract problems in
U.S.-Japanese Joint Ventures, 39 WASH. L. REV. 479, 490-91 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Henderson]; Tatsuta, Types of Business Organizations at 56, in 1 M. TATSUTA & D. HENDERSoN,
JAPANESE Business CORPORATION LAW (date undetermined) (locally produced textbook for the Asian
Law Program, University of Washington School of Law) [Hereinafter cited as Tatsuta-Henderson
text]; and N. KOBAYASHI, NInoN No GOBEN GAiSA (Japanese joint venture corporations) 125 n.2
(1967) [Hereinafter cited as KOBAYASHI].
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corporation are quite diverse. In the United States, most consist of provisions
inserted in the Articles of Incorporation, in the by-laws, or in shareholder or
other agreements.' The Japanese have not developed these techniques to
anything like the degree of detail and sophistication found in the United States,
largely because (1) most corporations are formed without any input from
lawyers, and (2) the Japanese when doing business among themselves use
alternative techniques for handling the problems which Americans attempt to
resolve by anticipatory drafting techniques.4 Furthermore, the Japanese system
is more circumscribed due to the absence of the by-law device, thus relegating
the regulation of internal corporate matters not included in the Articles of
Incorporation to a lower level of legal formality than the American system.
When corporations steeped in the differing systems come together, they
should consider providing safeguards which do not overly depend upon
adherence by both parties to the often unwritten rules of the one society,
understood faintly, if at all, by the outsider. Thus, the more explicit techniques
of the American system have basic appeal as a method of accommodation in the
Japanese joint-venture corporation formed by multi-national parties.
Frustrations develop, however, in attempting to determine the extent to which
the American techniques can be accommodated within the Japanese system.
B. Basic Principles and Guidelines
In attempting to assess the efficacy of various devices under the Japanese law,
it is first necessary to cope with the compartmentalization of the Japanese legal
system. In Japanese law, not only is there a basic distinction between public and
private law, under which agreements in violation of public law provisions may
still be enforceable as a matter of private law, s but there is also a rather
complete segregation of the discrete sections of private law. 6 Thus, the mere fact
that a particular technique for achieving the interests of one party in a joint
3See generally F. CY NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONs LAW AND PRAcrIcE (1971). [Hereinafter cited
as O'NEAL]. This two-volume work with supplements is the basic guide through American close
corporation law and is an excellent planner's tool.
4See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 2, at 481-82, and H. GL.AzER, THE INTERNATIONAL BUMNEsRAnAN
IN JAPAN 51-90 (1968).
'See, e.g., Tomita v. Inoue, 19 Saik5 saibansho minji hanreishii [hereinafter cited as Minshu]
2306 (Sup. Cit., 1st P.B., Dec. 23, 1965) and other cases holding contracts valid even when they
violate provisions of regulatory laws. A good general discussion of the public-private law dichotomy
can be found in 1 J. TANAKA, GYosEIHo KOGI (Lectures in administrative law) 109-18 (1965).
'The basic provisions relating to contract law are found within Chapter II of Book III of the Civil
Code, as part of the law of claim or obligation (saiken), while the corporate law, governing
corporations, is found as Chapter IV of Book II of the Commercial Code. Legal scholarship in Japan
deals with these as compartmentalized and discrete fields of study, with the corporate law specialist
rarely, if ever, delving into the realm of contract law in his analysis. A typical example of this is T.
IsHii, KMASHAHO (Corporate law) (1967) [Hereinafter cited as IsHiS]. A rather exhaustive study
of most of this two-volume work discloses that the topic of shareholder agreements is discussed only
with regard to the efficacy of shareholder agreements restricting transfer of shares. See 1 id. at
168-73.
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venture corporation cannot be exercised through a provision in the Articles of
Incorporation does not necessarily invalidate that technique when made part of
a contract. This segregation or dichotomy between basic contract concepts in
the Civil Code, on the one hand, and matters of the law of corporations found in
the Commercial Code, on the other hand, leads to the widespread belief that an
agreement between shareholders to accomplish a given objective will be valid, at
least between the parties, even though the result runs contrary to provisions of
corporate law. 7 It also leads to a compartmentalization of thinking among the
scholars, so that the corporate law scholar rarely considers the role of
agreements as they might affect corporate relations, and the contract law
specialist rarely applies his knowledge to determine the effects of contracts in
separate fields of study not specifically enumerated in the Civil Code.8
Looking to the field of contract law, one starts with the basic concept of
freedom of contract, applied with greater vigor in Japan than in the United
States.9 If applied in full force to agreements which allocate power among
shareholders or bind them to make certain decisions on behalf of the joint
venture corporation, this principle would lead to the conclusion that such
agreements are fully enforceable. In actual fact, although there is frequently
little evidence upon which to base the conclusion, such agreements may be valid
and effective within amazingly broad limits. Some of these limits are those
generally recognized in the Japanese Civil Code, primarily as built into articles
1, 90, and 91.
Article 110 probably could pose a barrier to freedom to contract in the context
of the present type of situation. It sets forth essentially three principle doctrines:
(1) public welfare, (2) good faith, and (3) the abuse of rights doctrine. Although
the first of these three potentially could cause some difficulty when a party seeks
to enforce a shareholder agreement, this principle is primarily aimed at
protecting rights of the public from being destroyed by private party
agreement,"' and therefore does not appear appropriate where, as here, there
'See, Henderson, supra note 2, at 486-87,492,500; KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 124 n. 1: and M.
Kitazawa, S~ritsuchi, no kaisha (Corporation in process of formation), in 1 K. TANAKA, KABtSuHIx
GAISHAH6 K6ZA (Lectures on the law of stock corporations) 211, 217-19 (1962). See generally
Ohara, G~ben gaisha no setsuritsu tetsuzuki (Procedures for setting up a joint venture corporation),
SHSJI HSMu KENKYi3 (Serialized over 30 issues starting with No. 459 (1968) and ending with No.
509 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ohara, followed by a specific reference to the particular issue and
page.]
'See note 6, supra. An exhaustive search through the periodical literature index (kiji sakuin) also
discloses a dearth of material spanning the two fields.
'See generally T. Taneguchi, keiyaku no jiyii (freedom of contract), in 13 CHUSHAKO MIMP
(Civil code annotated) 37-43 (1966).
"Civil Code art. 1: All private rights shall conform to the public welfare. 2. The exercise of rights
and performance of duties shall be accomplished in good faith and in accordance with the principles
of trust. 3. No abusing of rights is permissible.
"See S. WAGATSUMA, MIMPb SOSOKU (General provisions of the Civil Code) 33-34, 38-39
(1965) [hereinafter cited as WAGATSUMA]. As an example, he mentioned a private right to float
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are no outside parties affected by the agreement. Of course, if there were other
shareholders in the corporation and they did not adhere to the contract, this
principle might apply to invalidate the agreement to the extent that they were
affected. The same result might also be achieved via the abuse of rights
principle. However, at least where there are but two shareholders and no third
party interests are involved, it seems doubtful that article 1 will provide a
significant barrier to the validity of a contract between two shareholders who
own all outstanding shares of the corporation.
Article 90 states that a juristic act (including the making of a contract) "which
has for its object such matters as are contrary to public policy or good morals is
null and void." 1 2 Superficially it would appear that an attempt to accomplish by
shareholder agreement what the Commercial Code would prohibit if included in
the Articles would run contrary to a well-defined public policy. However, the
courts have not fully developed this concept, and it has been narrowly limited.
Wagatsuma indicates that this provision generally would apply only to the
following types of situations: (1) juristic acts contrary to morality (such as
contracts sustaining immoral relationships), (2) juristic acts contrary to the
principles of justice (such as a contract to commit a crime or payment in
exchange for not doing a bad act), (3) juristic acts taking unfair advantage of
another's distress (such as usury), (4) excessive restrictions on an individual's
freedom (usually involuntary servitude types of situations), (5) limitations on
freedom to conduct economic enterprises (unreasonable covenants not to
compete, contracts between competitors which create monopolies or restraints
of trade), (6) acts which dispose of one's basic means of livelihood (seizon no
kisotaru zaisan o shobun suru koto), and (7) excessively speculative acts.I3 Thus,
most provisions in a shareholders' agreement of the type contemplated in this
article probably are not precluded by article 90, even though some individual
shareholder agreements might clash with that article (such as prohibited
limitations on one's freedom to conduct economic enterprises).
Article 91 probably provides the firmest foundation for recognizing the
validity of shareholder agreements in the context of this paper. That section
provides as follows:"4 "If the parties to a juristic act have declared an intention
which differs from any provisions of laws or ordinances which are not concerned
with public policy, such intention shall prevail."
Thus, even where the codes indicate that, for example, restrictions on share
transfers must be in the articles to be valid, so long as it would not violate public
logs on a river or canal, indicating that this right cannot interfere with the public's rights related to
electrical power, public water systems, and similar uses. Id. at 38-39.
"Civil Code art. 90.
"WAGATSUMA, Supra note 11, at 270-82.
"Civil Code art. 91.
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policy, the shareholders among themselves can agree to restrictions on share
transferability and have the agreement enforceable among themselves. A
problem arises, however, in that the Japanese recognize a distinction between
required provisions (ky6ko h6ki) and optional provisions (nin'i h6kO, and article
91 applies only when an optional provision is involved.'" Thus, before it can be
said that a particular legal provision is not binding when the contract has a
contrary clause, it may be necessary to determine (1) whether the particular
provision is mandatory or optional, and, if mandatory, (2) whether the
mandatory nature of a legal provision governing the corporation will also affect
a contract to which the corporation is not a party.
As can be seen from the above, one's conclusions concerning the efficacy of
shareholder agreements under the Japanese Civil Code depends on answers
which must be based upon an assessment of the impact of Commercial Code
provisions governing the corporation when the corporation itself is not a party to
the particular agreement. In this shadowy valley between the two codes, very
little Japanese scholarly light has been shed.
C. Basic Approach
In this article the writer will enumerate several of the more common
American devices for assuring protection of specific shareholder interests in
close corporations, indicating briefly how they work in this country. Then,
turning to Japanese law, he will determine whether the Commercial Code
addresses itself to the problem either by prohibiting use of the device, restricting
its use, or permitting or requiring its use. Then it will be necessary to determine
the advisability of placing it in the Articles of Incorporation, putting it in a side
agreement, or not using it at all. Later, the remedies available when a party has
acted contrary to the agreed-to provisions will be discussed.
II. Individual Devices
A. Voting Agreements, Including Pooling Agreements,
Voting Trusts, and Irrevocable Proxies
There are several types of voting agreements recognized in American law, of
which pooling agreements, voting trusts, and irrevocable proxies are the most
common.
1. POOLING AGREEMENTS
A pooling agreement is one in which all or a portion of the shareholders of a
corporation agree to pool their votes and to vote all of them in favor of
ISSee W. SHATTUCK& Z. KITAGAWA, U.S./JAPANESE CONTRACT AND SALES PROBLEMS at 113 &
200 (1970) (locally produced textbook for the Asian Law Program, University of Washington)
[hereinafter cited as Shattuck & Kitagawal; and WAGATSUMA supra note 293-95.
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designated directors.16 In the context of a Japanese-American joint venture
corporation with all shares held by two shareholders, such an agreement would,
for example, require both parties to vote for a full slate of candidates, half
nominated by the Japanese shareholder and half by the American shareholder.
O'Neal concludes that:"7
By the great weight of authority, an agreement by some or all of the shareholders to
combine their votes for directors is valid, even in the absence of specific statutory
sanction, at least as long as the agreement does not attempt to control the discretion of
the directors, contemplate fraud, oppression or wrong against other shareholders, or
otherwise have an illegal purpose.
This kind of arrangement does not easily lend itself to a provision in the articles
or by-laws, and there is little American law indicating whether a provision in the
articles authorizing such a method of voting would be upheld.' 8
In Japan, there is no specific provision in the Commercial Code dealing with
pooling devices. The code does specify, however, that each shareholder shall
have one vote for each share, 9 and it has been pointed out that this is
mandatory law, so that any provision in the articles to the contrary will be void
unless expressly permitted by statute. 0 Thus, a provision in the articles allowing
pooling of rights arguably has no validity.
It would appear, however, that regardless of whether such a provision can be
inserted in the articles, a shareholder agreement by which the parties agree to
restrict their votes would be valid. Scholarly opinions are split on the subject,
with some feeling these are void, and others indicating they would be valid."
Most indicate, however, that even if such agreements are valid and enforceable,
if a shareholder exercises his voting rights in violation of the agreement, his vote
would still be valid as cast." On the practical side, as well, there is evidence
these agreements are considered valid. Several authors have suggested that
agreements between shareholders regarding division of directors in a joint
venture corporation should routinely be included. 3 Thus, these types of
"I O'NEAI, supra note 3, at §5.12.
"Id.
"Cf Sensabaugh v. Poison Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1958).
'Commercial Code art. 241.
201 IsHii, supra note 6, at 237-38.
"See 4. CHUSHAKU, KAiSHAH6 (Corporate law annotated) 78 (1968). See also M. HISHIDA,
KAnUNUSsn No GIKETSUKEN K5SHi To KAISHL SnIAI (Exercise of shareholder voting rights and
corporate control) 153-59 (1964) [hereinafter cited as HISHIDA]. Hishida indicates the majority view
probably opposes such agreements, but feels their position is not well taken. He does state, however,
that agreements which contain provisions contrary to express prohibitions of the code or which
constitute an abuse of rights would be invalid-not on general principles, but due to the particular
purpose and nature of the specific provisions. Id. at 155-56.
224. CHUSHAKU KAIsHAHU at 78; HISHIDA at 156.
"See, e.g., KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 139; Ohara, supra note 7, No. 11, SHURh H6Mu KENKYU
(No. 474) at 23; cf GAIKOKU KAWASE B6EK KENKYUIKAI, GAIKOKUJIN No NIHON NI OKERU
G6BEN GAiSHA SETSURITSU KEIYAKU NI TsuiTE (Regarding formation contracts for joint venture
corporations with foreigners in Japan) 36-38 (1%3) [hereinafter cited as B6FIm KENKrOKAI; and
KOKUSAI T6SHX KENKYUKAI, GUBEN GAISHA NO SETSUrssTSU YORI KESSAN MADE (Joint venture
corporations from formation to liquidation) 71-73 (1962) [hereinafter cited as T6sHi KENKYOKA!].
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agreements would appear to be a viable means of committing the parties to a
pre-determined organization of the board of directors, even though a vote in
violation of the agreement would not be invalidated.
2. VOTING TRUSTS
Voting trusts as used in the United States are devices by which the
shareholders transfer title to their shares to voting trustees in return for "voting
trust certificates." 24 The trustees become shareholders of record and the
transferors become beneficial owners. The trust agreement can then spell out
how the trustee is to exercise his rights. Washington and many other states have
explicit statutory provisions governing voting trusts,2" with the Washington
provision allowing a trust to be initially set up for ten years and renewable for a
like period.16 It is generally held that where there is a voting trust statute, any
voting trust violative of its provisions is invalid.27
The Japanese Commercial Code makes no explicit provision for voting trusts;
however, article 239-2 seems to imply the existence of such trusts, as it indicates
the corporation can refuse to allow a shareholder to cast his votes "disunitedly"
unless "he accepted a trust of shares or otherwise... possesses the shares for the
benefit of another." '28 However, it would appear that these provisions refer to
ordinary trusts, governed by ordinary trust law, and not to voting trusts.2 9
Consequently, there is probably no basis for inserting a provision allowing
voting trusts into the articles, especially since doing so would appear to violate
the one-share, one vote concept of article 241.30
Provision for a voting trust through a shareholder agreement would perhaps
be acceptable. Scholarly opinion is split on the matter. Such agreement is
considered by many to be void either (1) because it is an illegal transfer of a
voting right, or (2) because it has the purpose of conferring on another a
personal voting right. However, some others feel that such an agreement can be
valid like any other trust agreement, depending primarily upon the provisions in
the agreement and similar matters." Ishii, on the other hand, finds other
grounds for objecting to such agreements, indicating that voting trusts must be
4See 1 'NEAL, §5.31.
2
sSee, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.330.
2 1d.
"See, O'NEAL §5.31.
"Commercial Code art. 239-2.
"See 4 CHTOSHAKU KAISHAH6 at 67-68. Accord, HISHIDA, supra note 21, at 178, stating flatly
there are no provisions for voting trusts in Japaense law.
"See note 19 and accompanying text, supra. Henderson, supra note 2, at 502 & nn.96-98
indicates that scholars are unanimous in considering these as unacceptable. He states this
conclusion is based in part on the provisions indicating that proxies are only good for one general
meeting.
"See 4 CHESHAKu KAIsHAH3 at 78-79, where the split of authorities is set out. HiSHiDA, who
authored that portion of CHi3SHAKU K~ SHAH6, has long advocated the view that such agreements
are valid. See HISHIDA, supra note 21, at 182-83.
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considered void primarily because they are contrary to the spirit of the
Commercial Code and either illegal or void as attempts to evade its provisions.32
To bolster the view that such agreements, if not void, are at least risky, it should
be noted that authors who suggested that pooling-type agreements should
routinely be used in joint ventures apparently have not given serious
consideration to voting trusts.33
3. IRREVOCABLE PROXIES
In United States law, an irrevocable proxy was long in disrepute, even though
it essentially accomplished nothing more than what could be gained by other
forms of voting agreements. Perhaps the major exception was the "proxy
coupled with an interest" concept based on a very early Supreme Court opinion.
Lately, however, there has been an increasing tendency to consider such
irrevocable proxies to be valid in an increasingly large variety of situations, so
that at least in the close corporation context they may have become generally
acceptable devices."'
In Japan, irrevocable proxies have no sanction under the Commercial Code,
which explicitly states that proxies are good for only one general meeting.35
There is some controversy concerning whether this restriction is also binding on
shareholder agreements. Ishii flatly states that a proxy can only be good for one
meeting, and that a continuing power of attorney (or irrevocable proxy) is
invalid, except where a foreigner has elected an individual representative to
administer his property in Japan.3 6 Henderson, however, based upon the
contract-corporate law dichotomy, indicates that such agreements would be
valid. 37 The irrevocable proxy, however, would appear to be a rather inflexible
tool. Even if valid, it would only work to give one or the other of the two
shareholders, or a third party to whom both had given irrevocable proxies,
absolute decision-making power at the shareholder level. Thus, faced with the
rather more explicit language of the Commercial Code and the absence of
support for irrevocable proxies from the Japanese authorities, it would be best to
disregard this particular device and to consider one of the other voting
agreement devices as the better instrument to protect minority rights.
B. High Voting and Quorum Requirements, Including Express Veto Powers,
and Special Requirements for Amending the Articles, Authorizing
the Issuance of Stock and Fundamental Corporate Acts
"21 ISHII, supra note 63, at 148.
"See authorities cited in note 23, supra.
"See 1 O'NEAL at §5.36.
"Commercial Code art. 239(4); see Henderson, supra note 2, at 502.
361 IsHIn, supra note 6, at 245.
"See Henderson, supra note 2, at 502.
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1. VETO POWERS
In the United States, it is often possible to include an express veto power in
the articles or by-laws. This veto can be in the form of a requirement of
shareholder unanimity or an equivalent requirement for director action."
Express veto provisions have also been included in shareholder agreements,
although O'Neal feels this method is much more risky than a charter or by-law
provision. 39 Ordinarily these provisions are included only if all shareholders are
parties to the agreement, and even then they might not be enforceable,
especially as against the corporation.4
In Japan there is no express statutory prohibition against the veto power
concept. While certain minimum requirements for passing resolutions of
shareholders are set out in the Commercial Code, there is no prohibition on
making these more stringent." Note, however, that scholarly opinion is split on
whether the two-thirds requirement of article 343, which applies to several
fundamental corporate decisions,42 can be raised by a provision in the articles, 43
and Ishii states, without further authority, that a requirement of unanimity
would be void. 4 The Commercial Code also has specific provisions regarding
voting requirements for directors' decisons, with article 206-2 permitting a more
stringent requirement to be placed in the articles. 45 However, there are many
who feel that a veto-type provision would be void, including one by which the
vote of a particular director must be included in those favoring a proposition. 46
Thus, even though there is some authority which would recognize a veto power
provision in some situations, the issue is sufficiently beclouded to raise a
warning that such a provision is not advisable. This conclusion is especially true
when the capital liberalization problens are considered. For an enterprise to
qualify for automatic approval of up to 50 percent foreign investment (the
"See 1 O'NEA . at §§4.01, et seq.; but note that he cautions that some jurisdictions would not
allow a requirement of unanimity. Id. at §§4.19-4.20.
"1 O'NAL at §5.19.
"See id.
"See Commercial Code arts. 239 & 243. Accord, 1 ISHII, supra note 6, at 260.
"Commercial Code art. 343. This article requires that certain shareholder resolutions be adopted
by "two-thirds or more of the votes of the shareholders present who hold shares representing more
than one-half of the total number of the issued shares." Ism lists 14 decisions for which the
requirements of article 343 apply. See I IsHI, supra note 6, at 267-69. For the most part, these come
within the American understanding of fundamental corporate decisions, and are clearly enumerated
in various parts of the Commercial Code.
"3See 1 IsmI, supra note 6, at 267, where he indicates Matsuda and Nishihara claim the
requirements of articles 343 cannot be raised, as article 343 does not expressly so state, and that
Okuma and N6tsu indicate an increase to a three-quarter vote .requirement would be valid. 8(1)
CHUSHAKU KAISHAH6 at 24-25 gives a fuller elaboration among opposing views and lists ISHII as a
supporter of the view that the requirements can be made more stringent.
44IsHI at 267.8(1) CHOSHAKu KAISHAH6 at 24-25 indicates, however, that some authorities would
accept a unanimity requirement as valid.
"Commercial Code art. 260-2. The basic voting requirement is an affirmative vote of a majority of
the directors present, with a quorum consisting of a majority of all directors.
"See 4 CH15SHAKU KAISHAH6 at 343, and 1 ISHI at 325.
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so-called partially liberalized sector), there can be no provision that the
decisions of the corporation require the unanimous agreement of all the
shareholders or the consent of any particular member of the board of
directors.4 7
Assuming that an explicit veto-type of provision in the articles risks being
considered invalid, it is next necessary to determine if a unanimity provision or a
veto provision inserted in a shareholders' agreement would be acceptable. Such
a provision has been rarely considered in Japan. Based upon the Japanese legal
distinction between corporate law and contract law, theoretically, at least, such
a provision in a shareholders' agreement should be valid between the
shareholders. One should be concerned, however, that this might be one place
where article 1 of the Civil Code might be applied to nullify such a provision,
either on the basis of "public welfare" or as an "abuse of rights." In inserting
these kinds of provisions in shareholder agreements, the parties are in effect
surreptitiously altering the apparent decision-making structure of the
corporation, so that the public policy behind the Commercial Code provisions
requiring certain votes in the corporation is circumvented, a factor likely to be
weighed adversely by a court which finds that the corporation's interests in
policing its own voting procedures have been thwarted by a contract giving veto
power to a foreign minority. So long as the corporation is considered a third
party as to this contract, a provision which in effect amends a provision of its
articles (in contrast to one merely agreeing among the shareholders as to how
they will vote) may be attacked both due to the interference with public interests
regarding the operation of the corporation and because the shareholders have
abused their rights in ways affecting seriously the operation of the third party
corporation. Although no explicit authority for this proposition can be found,
the general tenor of legal authorities would seem to support it. 8
2. SPECIAL VOTING AND QUORUM REQUIREMENTS
In the United States, it is common for the articles to contain higher voting
requirements for shareholder decisions than required by law, and this custom is
expressly sanctioned in the statutes of many states. 9 In additon, the statutes
require a greater majority for certain fundamental acts, even without a provision
"
7 Tainai chokusetsu t6shi nado no jiyka ni tsuite kakugi kettei (Cabinet decision concerning
liberalization of inward investments), No. 3, 1(1)I(a)(vi)(June 6, 1967), in F. YOSHIDA, SHIHON
JIYUKA TO GAISHIH5 (Capital liberalization and the law concerning foreign investment) at 158
(1967). Note, however, that the prohibition on veto or unanimity provisions does not apply as a
condition to automatic validation in the fully liberalized sector. Id. at No. 3, 1(1)1(b). Does this
provision impliedly permit such provisions in Japanese Law?
"'Concerning abuse of rights in the setting of corporate relations, see especially the discussion and
examples in 1 CHJSHAKU MIMp6 at 135-37. Regarding public welfare, see id. at 53-67. See generally
WAGATSUMA, supra note 11, at 33-41.
4'See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §23A.44.070.
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in the articles."0 The quorum can be freely set in the articles, although low
quorums are impractical where a high percentage of total issued shares must
approve a decision." Likewise, quorum and voting requirements for directors
can be freely raised by provisions in the articles or by-laws of the corporation.52
These same matters probably can be accomplished by a shareholder agreement,
as in the case of agreements regarding unanimity or veto powers, but this
method appears to be rarely if ever used. 3
In Japan, the Commercial Code already provides the structure for higher
quorum and voting requirements for certain fundamental acts, and these
provisions of themselves are often sufficient to protect the interests of
substantial minorities, so long as the articles include express pre-emptive-rights
provisions.54 However, often in the case of certain ordinary decisions of
shareholders or the election of directors, express arrangements may be
desirable. This result can be readily achieved by a provision inserted in the
articles.5 5 Likewise, the quorum and voting requirements for director action can
be made more stringent through a provision in the articles.5 " Thus, the kind of
protection for minority shareholders which we seek can best be attained by the
existing statutory requirements plus statutorily authorized provisions in the
articles. This solution often can be every bit as effective as any attempt to obtain
a requirement of unanimity or an express veto right, and for this reason, this
method is decidedly preferable to an attempt to use the other techniques.5 7
Since arrangements for higher quorum and voting requirements can be
adequately handled without resort to a shareholder agreement, there usually
will be little reason for resorting to the latter technique for this purpose.
"
0See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§23a.16.020, 20.030, and .24.020.
"
1See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.290, which states: "Unless otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation, a majority of the shares entitled to vote.., shall constitute a quorum at a
meeting of shareholders...." But note that certain fundamental decisions require at least a
two-thirds vote of all shareholders, and thereforce can be accomplished only with a quorum of at
least that number. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§23A.16.020, .20.030, and .24.020.
52See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.390, which indicates:
A majority of the number of directors fixed by the by-laws, or . . . in the articles of
incorporation, shall constitute a quorum . . .unless a greater number is required by the
articles of incorporation or the by-laws. The act of the majority of the directors present ...
shall be the act of the board of directors, unless the act of a greater number is required by the
articles of incorporation or the by-laws.
3Since the inclusion of such provisions in the articles or by-laws is both simple and generally
accepted, such shareholder agreements have proved unnecessary. In contrast to the express veto
provision whereby a particular individual must approve, this form of control can more easily be
handled by a non-contractual provision. See generally 1 O'NEAL at §5.19.
"See, e.g., Commercial Code art. 343. See note 42, supra, regarding what areas are controlled by
this provision. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 501-04.
"Commercial Code art. 239 expressly authorizes higher requirements or ordinary resolutions,
while art. 256-2 does the same for the election of directors. Inclusion of such a provision governing
election of directors is essential, as the code only requires a quorum of one-third.
"
6Commercial Code art. 260-2.
"See notes 41-48 and accompanying text, supra.
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Moreover, an attempt to raise quorum or voting requirements by shareholder
agreement probably would encounter many of the same problems that were
explored in discussing contract provisions regarding veto powers. 8
C. Classification of Shares and Classification
of Directors
In American law, it is often common to set up two classes of shares, and then
to establish two classes of directors, each to be elected solely by the shareholders
of a particular class. 5 9 This classification of shares will reflect in other corporate
decisions as well, such as some major decisions requiring a two-thirds vote of
each class of shareholders. 60 There appears to be no practical way to accomplish
the same objective via a shareholder agreement, as the types of shares and
certain information about each class of shares must be included in the articles. 61
In Japan, multiple classes of shares may be issued, but particulars and
numbers of shares must be determined by the articles.6 Note, however, that
many details related to these shares and their allocation need not be stipulated
in the articles, and thus these matters could be the subject of a shareholder
agreement.63 It is also possible to create non-voting shares, so long as they do
not exceed 25 percent of all issued shares.6 4 However, since so many details
concerning the classes of shares and related matters must be included in the
articles, 65 a shareholder agreement can only be of limited usefulness as a
supplement to provisions found in the articles.
D. Cumulative Voting
Cumulative voting is a popular method of assuring minority representation in
American corporations. Almost all corporate statutes have some reference to
"See note 48 and accompanying text, supra.
"See 1 'NEAL at §3.23. This classification of directors is not to be confused with classification of
directors as used in WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.360 and other corporation statutes. The latter is a
method of classifying the director positions so that only a portion of them will be filled by election
each year. Such a system is popular as a method of destroying the effectiveness of cumulative voting
rights, and thus suppressing some minority voice in the corporation. Classification of shares, with
some directors to be elected by distinct classes of shareholders on the other hand, guarantees
representation to diverse groups of shareholders.
601 O'NEAL at §3.24; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §23A.16.030.
"See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §23A.12.020.
"Commercial Code art. 222.
"Commercial Code art. 222(3) indicates: "[Special stipulations may be made in respect of each
class of shares, as to the taking of new shares, the consolidation or retirement of shares, or the
allotment of shares by reason of amalgamation, even where no provisions have been made in the
articles of incorporation." See 1 IsHI at 74-75.
"Commercial Code art. 242.
sSee, e.g., Commercial Code art. 166, recognized as a mandatory provision for the formation of a
corporation. See 1 IsHi at 67-71. It should also be noted that article 242 appears to authorize
non-voting shares only when they are preferred shares, and that the non-voting aspect only extends
to decisions related to the distribution of profits.
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it-some making the right to cumulative voting mandatory, some rejecting it
outright, and others making it optional. 66 Washington, for example, has passed
through all three phases. At present, cumulative voting is statutorily
authorized, unless the articles of a corporation expressly remove the right to
cumulative voting.67 This posture is a departure from prior Washington law,
which first provided only for straight voting and later shifted to mandatory
cumulative voting.68 The cumulative voting area probably is one in which there
was little room for shareholder agreements. However, it might not be out of
place for the shareholders to agree among themselves not to exercise this right
even when authorized, or not to seek an amendment to the articles abolishing
the right.
In Japan, the right to cumulative voting is based upon article 256-3 of the
Commercial Code. 69 However, the Code authorizes a provision in the articles
prohibiting cumulative voting.70 Prior to the amendment of the Commercial
Code in 1974, a prohibition against cumulative voting placed in the articles was
ineffective where shareholders with 25 percent or more of the total voting shares
wished to exercise cumulative voting rights, but the 1974 amendments to the
code deleted this limitation on the ability of the corporation to abolish
cumulative voting. 7' As in the United States, there is little room for a
shareholder agreement to operate in this area. However, where the initial
articles have not included a prohibition on cumulative voting, the shareholders,
or at least a block of shareholders large enough to prevent amendment of the
articles, may wish to agree that they will refrain from any attempt to amend the
articles to prohibit cumulative voting. Were such an agreement to be made,
there is no reason it would not be valid, as it clearly does not conflict with any
provision of the various codes. 71
E. Restrictions on the Transfer of Shares
In the United States, although the practice varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, many forms of restrictions on the transfer of shares have been
upheld. These can be placed in the articles, the by-laws, a shareholders'
"See generally, W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 285-88 (1969).
"WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.300.
"For discussion of the prior Washington law, see State ex rel. Swanson v. Perham, 30 Wn.2d 368,
191 P.2d 689 (1948).
"Commercial Code art. 256-3.
"Ild.
"Former Commercial Code art. 256-4. A comparative text of the new and old Codes following the
1974 amendments can be found in Sh6h6 Kaisei san h6ritsu Shinkyi! taish6hy6 (Comparison of the
new and old texts of three commercial laws), JsURSTO (No. 560) 56 et. seq. (1974).
"Although explicit authority is lacking, there is no reason this type of agreemeht would be
contrary to any of the major principles of Japanese law, including the provisions of article 1 of the
Civil Code.
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agreement, or all three. " O'Neal recommends that these matters be handled at
the inception by both an agreement and a provision in the articles and perhaps
inserted yet a third time in the by-laws.74 In addition to problems involved in
deciding where to place the restrictions, it is also necessary to choose the type of
restrictions, noting particularly that "absolute restrictions unlimited in
time ... have almost without exception been held invlaid." 75 The forms of
restraints obtaining the approval of a number of courts in the United States
include consent restraints, first options, buy-out arrangements, and
redemption provisions.76 In considering the use of various instruments, the
American draftsman often avoids a straight shareholder agreement as the sole
method, as such a restriction may not be effective to block a transfer in violation
of it, and it often is held that such an agreement would also not be binding on
the third party transferee, who would take the shares free of any further
restriction.77
In Japan, a 1966 amendment to the Commercial Code expressly allowed
insertion of a provision in the articles requiring approval of the board of
directors before shares can be transferred to a third party.7" The selling
shareholder can request the board to name a substitute buyer should it
disapprove of the buyer originally intended by the seller.79 This amendment
somewhat blunted a previously heated debate concerning whether shareholder
agreements restricting transferability would be valid.8" Use of this provision
would seem highly desirable in many cases.
Despite the 1966 amendment, there are two situations in which use of a
shareholder agreement may become important. The first case occurs when the
articles are silent concerning restrictions on transferability, and the second
occurs when the shareholders wish to insert into a shareholder agreement
restrictions on transferability which differ from those which can be placed in the
articles under the 1966 amendments. The extent to which these matters can be
accomplished by shareholder agreement remains quite controversial.
Some authorities believe that where there is no article provision restricting
transferability of shares, any attempt to bind all shareholders and the
corporation by agreement would be void, as a violation of the principle of free
transferability of shares. 8 Nonetheless, many believe the same result may be
"See generally 2 ONEAL at Ch. 7.





"Commercial Code arts. 204 to 204-5. See IsHH at 168-73.
"Commercial Code art. 204-2.
"See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 2, at 492-95.
"See, e.g., 1 ISHII at 172; see also the split of authorities which existed prior to the 1966
amendment of the Commercial Code cited in Henderson at 493 n.65.
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accomplished by agreements between individual shareholders and the
corporation, so long as they are not unfair restrictions,"' and most state
categorically that such agreements when made among shareholders (without the
participation of the coporation) will be valid, as they are outside the scope of
coverage of article 204 of the Commercial Code. 83 It should be noted, however,
that these agreements suffer from a problem similar to that seen in the United
States-namely, that they may not be set up against a third party transferee. 4
Amazingly, there seems to be little discussion concerning whether shareholder
agreements which go beyond what could be accomplished by a provision in the
articles could be valid if they pass the test of fairness. It would appear, however,
based primarily upon the fact that prior to the 1966 amendment some
shareholder agreements were upheld, that such restrictions, if not unfair, would
be considered valid. 85
F. Employment and Management Contracts:
Agreements as to Who Will Be Officers
A number of shareholder agreements in the United States contain provisions
naming the persons to occupy some or all corporate offices or giving certain
contracting parties the right to name certain officers. Although increasingly
accepted, these types of provisions have been attacked on the following
grounds:86 (1) the agreement violates the statutory section (in the corporate law
of practically every state) providing that the directors shall manage -the
corporation's affairs; (2) it violates statutes (found in many jurisdictions) which
expressly provide that the directors shall select corporate officers; (3) it tends to
cause the directors to disregard their fiduciary duties to the corporation and to
other shareholders; (4) it is unfair to non-contracting shareholders or might
injuriously affect them. The path to acceptability for these kinds of provisions
has been smoothed by provisions such as that in the Washington corporate code
which authorizes officers to be appointed by the board of directors "or chosen in
such other manner as may be prescribed by the by-laws." 87
Management contracts are agreements between the corporation and others
entrusting aspects of its management to particular individuals or corporations.
They have proved less acceptable than shareholder agreements regarding
officers and employment, and have been attacked primarily as violations of
statutory requirements that the affairs of a corporation shall be managed by its
"See. e.g., 1 Isn at 172-73 and authorities cited therein.
"See 1 IsHn at 173 and authorities cited therein. Accord, Henderson at 493 and authorities cited
therein at 493 n.66. See also Ohara, supra note 7, No. 20, S8861 H6Mu KxN.vyi (No. 497) at 26.
"See Henderson at 493; 1 Isiu at 173; and 3 CHiJSAKU KAISAH6 at 66.
"Accord, KOBAYASHX, supra note 2, at 126. But see 3 CHfSHAKU KAiSHAH6 at 66, which can be
read to the contrary.
" O'NEAL at §6.17.
"WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.470; see 1 O'NEALat §5.17.
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board and on the basis that the directors do not have the capacity to enter into
long-term contracts binding future boards for long periods on such basic policy
or management matters.88 They still remain quite vulnerable in the United
States, despite some recent decisions upholding some management contracts. 89
Employment contracts between the corporation and a given key employee,
whether a shareholder or not, have been used in the United States, but, like
management contracts, their validity beyond a short period of time is quite
speculative.9" Such contracts, if extending for any length of time, should be
based upon clear authority derived from the board of directors by resolution.9
In Japan much the same type of statutory problem must be faced. The
Commercial Code requires the directors both to administer the affairs of the
company and to appoint the representative director(s). 2 However, shareholder
agreements regarding designation of officers and other key employees are
considered to be a natural matter of legitimate concern in joint venture
corporations, and they do not appear to have been seriously challenged.93 Such
shareholder agreements appear to be valid; however they probably are not
enforceable against the corporation, should its board of directors choose to
exercise its powers without regard to the shareholder agreement. A close
analogy can be drawn to pooling agreements already discussed. 94 On the other
hand, any attempt to shift the actual formal designation from the board of
directors to the shareholders probably would be invalid as contrary to the
Commercial Code. 95
Attempts to set up management contracts or similar employment contracts
would also have to be channeled through the directors 'to be effective, as these
can be formalized only by making the corporation a party to them. Considering
the extent to which there is controversy over the scope to which the board can
delegate authority to the representative directors and other officials on a regular
"See 1 O'NEALat §5.39.
"See id. There he indicates:
[Tihe validity of a contract by which a corporation vests control of its affairs in another
person or company seems to depend on the number and importance of the powers that are
delegated, the length of time for which the powers are to be held, and perhaps on the purpose
of the contract or the situation out of which it arises. Management contracts delegating
substantially all management powers to outsiders for indefinite or extended periods of time
are usually held invalid.
"See id. at §§6.05-6.06.
"See id. at §6.07,
"Commercial Code arts. 260 and 261.
"See, e.g., Ohara, supra note 7, No. 19, SH6JI H6MU KENKYO (No. 495) at 26; BOEKI
KENKYOmI, supra note 23, at 36-38; and T6sui KFNXY(kAi, supra note 23, at 71-73.
"See notes 16-23 and accompanying text, supra.
"See 4 CHi&SHAKU KAIHAH6 at 335, and Commercial Code art. 230-2, the latter reading as
follows: "The resolution shall be adopted by a general meeting [of shareholders] as to only the
matters provided for in this code or the articles of incorporation." This article was added in the 1950
revision of the code and was designed to narrow the scope of decision-making power of the
shareholders.
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basis, 96 it would be reasonable to conclude that any long-term delegation of
authority or any excessive delegation of significant authority beyond this
immediate circle of officials would likely be struck down as an evasion of the
provisions of article 260.
G. Restrictions on Salaries of Directors and Officers
In a close corporation where a shareholder with sizeable minority interest is
basically an outsider regarding day-to-day management, the majority insiders
can establish high salaries for themselves and thereby increase their return while
reducing the return to the minority through dividends. One method of
preventing this tactic in the United States involves inclusion of a provision in the
articles or by-laws concerning the method for fixing compensation.9 7
Restrictions on compensation can also be included in shareholder agreements.98
In Japan the Commercial Code requires that the compensation of directors as
directors be fixed in the articles or by resolution of the shareholders.99 Since the
code clearly indicates that this decision belongs to the shareholders, it should be
possible for the shareholders to agree among themselves concerning what the
salaries should be, and for such an agreement to be valid. If combined with a
higher than majority voting requirement for shareholder resolutions, "o minority
shareholders can usually be adequately protected in this way. When it comes to
the salaries of officers or director-officers, however, the problem is more
complex. Since directors are charged with the administration of the affairs of
the corporation, 1 ' there is a valid argument that this is a matter solely for the
directors' discretion. However, the prevailing opinion apparently supports the
view that the shareholders can set the salaries of directors working in other
capacities, both where the directors are working in these capacities primarily
because they are directors, and where their employment in the position is not
related to the fact that they are directors. 10 3 In both cases, this subject would be
appropriate for inclusion in a shareholder agreement. The salaries of other
employees, however, probably should not be handled through a shareholder
agreement, as this responsibility would ordinarily fall solely upon the directors,
and any such agreement would only be binding upon the corporate parents.
Thus, even if technically valid, an agreement setting the salaries of ordinary
employees would be ineffective should the directors choose to ignore it.
"See 4 CHUSHAKu KAmAHat 336-37 and authorities cited therein.
'See 2 0'N AL at §8.10.
"See 1 id. at §5.02.
"Commercial Code art. 269.
"'OSee notes 49-58 and accompanying text, supra.
1"Commercial Code art. 260.
"'See 4 CHTiSHAKU KAiSHAH6 at 532.
103Id.
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H. Restrictions on Dividends
One of the most frequent causes of controversy in close corporations is its
dividend policy. This problem is often most acute where one side is running the
corporation and deriving substantial salary and other remuneration, while the
other can derive benefits solely via the extraction of dividends. On the other
hand, especially in a multi-national corporation, the parties may disagree on
dividend policies due to different views on fundamental policies, different tax
considerations, and different national customs. In the United States, parties
often have attempted to control dividend policies by shareholder agreements,
but these still are frequently struck down in many states as an unjustified
interference with the powers of the directors.,0
In Japan, a shareholder agreement regarding a corporation's dividend policy
would probably be valid and effective. This conclusion is based primarily upon
the different locus of power regarding dividends. The Japanese Commercial
Code leaves the actual approval of dividends to the shareholder meeting, even
though in reality the shareholders merely have the opportunity to pass upon
what has already been decided by the directors. 05 The formality of placing the
dividend decision in the hands of the shareholders may mean little in the
average corporation; however, this provision does afford a reasonable basis for
holding that a shareholder agreement regarding dividends does not interfere
with any decision-making power of the directors, thus eliminating one of the
principal objections to these agreements in the United States. Primarily for this
reason, shareholders in Japanese corporations probably are free to agree among
themselves that they will only approve dividends of a certain amount or will
refrain from approving dividends not meeting certain criteria. 10 6 This type of
agreement, however, although useful to block certain dividends contrary to the
agreements, probably cannot be effective to compel a recalcitrant shareholder
to approve dividends which meet the criteria of the agreement.
L Pre-Emptive Rights
Many effective methods for protecting minority rights require the minority to
have a significant block of stock. Usually the minority must have at least
one-third of the total shares to be assured of effective checks upon majority
actions. 107 Thus, it is necessary to assure that such a percentage of shareholding
can be maintained. Perhaps the most effective tool for preserving this position is
1 O'NEAL at §5.20. American law usually leaves the decision regarding dividends to the board
of directors. See, e.g., WASH. RE,. CoDa §23A.08.420.
'
0
'Commercial Code arts. 281-283.
'This form of agreement was used in Ohara, supra note 7, No. 19, SH6n H6MU KaaxY6 (No.
495) at 26.
"'See Commercial Code art. 343 with its two-thirds majority requirement for certain major
decisions, and note that it extends, inter alia, to amendments of the articles under art. 342.
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to guarantee pre-emptive rights to existing shareholders.
In the United States, it is generally considered that, absent provisions in the
articles or statutes, a shareholder has a common law right to pre-emptive rights
on issuance of new shares."'8 Many statutes have modified these rights. The
Washington statute, for instance, allows such rights to be extinguished
altogether through a provision in the articles. 1 01 It is also possible to modify and
even to enhance these rights through a provision in the articles. 10 It would
appear that in American law, these rights ordinarily are not a subject of
shareholder agreement, although a shareholders' agreement may include
somewhat similar rights.
In Japan, unless the articles otherwise specify, it is a director decision whether
there will be pre-emptive rights upon the issuance of new shares, and, if so,
under what terms and conditions."' Thus, the articles should set out these
matters in detail sufficient to guarantee a meaningful opportunity for the
minority to protect itself by exercise of pre-emptive rights. If for some reason it
is undesirable to place all of these details in the articles, the code permits a
corporation to leave the matter of pre-emptive rights to the shareholders by
including a provision in the articles stating that matters relating to pre-emptive
rights are to be determined by shareholder resolution." 2 This code provision
opens the possibility that the scope of pre-emptive rights can be the subject of a
shareholder agreement spelling out the form of such rights and the various
details concerning their operation. In fact, this approach appears to be
generally acceptable in joint ventures in Japan, and a shareholder agreement is
a common method of handling the preemptive rights problem, where, for some
reason, a more detailed article provision is not desired." 3
J. Other Matters: Agreements as to Dispute
Resolution, Dissolution of the
Corporation, Arbitration, etc.
Shareholder agreements frequently include matters relating to the resolution
of shareholder deadlocks, often a critical point where there is an elaborate
system of checks and balances. One such method is an arbitration clause.
Arbitration of intracorporate disputes has had a painful history in the United
States, and cannot yet be considered a reliable remedy, due largely to judicial
reluctance to apply it to this field and to often-restrictive arbitration statutes. 1 4
'See 1 O'NEAL at §3.39.
'"WASH. REv. CODE §23A.08.220.
I 11d. See generally 1 O'NEAL at §3.39.
"'Commercial Code art. 280-2(1) (5-8).
"
2Commercial Code art. 280-2(1)
'See, e.g., Ohara, supra note 7, No. 11, SlH H6MU KENKY0J (No. 474) at 23.
"'See generally 2 O'NEAL at §§9.08-9.25.
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On the other hand, in Japan, with its stronger tradition of non-litigious
settlement of disputes of all sorts, the use of an effective arbitration clause
seems quite practicable. Arbitration of most disputes among shareholders
would appear to fall within the broadly permissive purview of arbitration under
the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:' ' "An agreement
for submission of a controversy to one or more arbitrators shall be valid insofar
as the parties are entitled to effect a compromise regarding the subject matter in
dispute." Note, however, that it may be difficult to settle some disputes when
the decision may have to be imposed directly on the joint venture corporation,
unless the joint venture corporation is also made a party to the agreement to
arbitrate. Nevertheless, arbitration agreements are routinely used in joint
venture corporations in Japan." 6 In including such a clause, however, the
draftsman should specify that the arbitration will be held in Japan under
Japanese law, in order to avoid possible application of American arbitration
law.
A more drastic method of dispute resolution involves an agreement to dissolve
the corporation on the happening of certain events or in case of irreconcilable
deadlock. This kind of provision has proved successful in many American close
corporations. 17 Use of the same type of clause would also be feasible in Japan,
as its validity is determined under contract law principles and it would merely
obligate the parties to take action not prohibited by the Commercial Code, as
dissolution can be based upon a resolution of the shareholders supported by a
sufficient number of votes required for major corporate decisions.118 The
Commercial Code also provides for dissolution of a deadlocked corporation
upon demand of a shareholder when irreparable injury would otherwise occur.
This right can be exercised by any ten-percent shareholder and does not require
a contractual provision to carry it out.'1 9
I. Remedies for Violation
A. Violation of Provisions in the Articles
When there has been a violation of provisions in the articles, the Commercial
Code provides rather specific remedies. Some of these are relatively ineffective,
while others are quite useful. This section will merely sketch the nature of these
remedies and will not be a study in depth.
Article 247 of the Commercial Code provides a mechanism for the rescission
" Code of Civil Procedure art. 786.
"'See, e.g., KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 127-32; Ohara, supra note 7, No. 13, SH6n HOMtf
KErncii (No. 477) at 23; T6sri KENKYUi, supra note 23, at 77; and B6a KI xyuxIu, supra note
23, at 53.
"See 2 O'NEAL at §9.06.
1"See Commercial Code arts. 404,405, and 343.
"'Commercial code art. 406-2.
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of a shareholder resolution which has been adopted by procedures which, inter
alia, are contrary to the articles.12" This action must be brought within three
months of the date of the resolution, I1 I and the courts have tended to blunt the
effectiveness of this tool by reserving the remedy only to a limited range of
situations, usually only those of most serious nature where the defects
substantially affected the result.122 This remedy would be available where, for
example, the resolution lacked the proper votes, or cumulative voting was
wrongfully prevented.
Where the contents of a shareholder resolution violate the Articles of
Incorporation, the resolution is subject to a demand for nullification, which is
not circumscribed as to when it must be brought, or by whom.1"3
If the directors have acted in violation of the articles, by resolution or
otherwise, participating directors are jointly and severally liable to the
corporation in performance or damages. 124 Should the corporation not institute
an action to enforce this liability, a shareholder-derivative suit is available much
as in the United States. 125 There is also the possibility of obtaining an injunction
against the acts of a director which violate the articles and "give rise to fear of
irreparable damage done to the company."'
126
B. Violation of Contractual Provisions
The first remedy for breach of a shareholder-contract that should be
considered is specific performance (ky6sei rikb). Specific performance is of
three types, direct enforcement (chokusetsu rik6 ky6sei), enforcement by
substitute performance (daitai rik6 ky6sei), and indirect enforcement of
performance (kansetsu ky6sei).' 2 Most of the contractual rights discussed in
this paper probably would be difficult to enforce through specific performance.
Direct performance, based upon Civil Code article 414, is considered not to
extend to an obligation to act or to forbear to act, which are the fundamental
subjects of most of the contractual provisions discussed. 12  Substituted
"'Commercial Code art. 247.
"'Commercial Code art. 248.
'See, e.g., It5 v. Nippon Germanium K~gy5 K.K., HAm IJm8 (No. 311) 27)Sup. Ct., Aut. 30,
1962). The reasoning of that case, literally taken would limit rescission only to cases in which the
defect can be demonstrated to have produced an outcome different from the result which would be
expected from following proper procedures. This view ignores the therapeutic effect of using
provisions like article 247 to force corporations to follow proper procedures as a matter of routine.
"'See Commercial Code art. 252, and T. IsHI, KAsuNism S&KAI NO KENKY6 (Studies on
shareholder meetings) 208-15 (1958).
"'Commercial Code art. 266.
"'Commercial Code art. 267.
2'Commercial Code art. 272. One wonders if a court would find that irreparable damage to the
corporation would result from an action contrary to the articles which injures the minority
shareholder but strengthens the hand of the majority shareholder. Would the policy factors weighed
depend on the nationality of the party urging the suit?
12'Shattuck & Kitagawa, supra note 1S, at 388,
'Civil Code art. 414(1).
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performance can apply to require performance of an act by a third party in
substitution for the agreed-to performance, and can include an act of
forbearance. 1I To use this remedy, for example, to enforce a voting agreement,
would require the court to designate a third party to cast the votes of the
defaulting shareholder. This method appears not to be feasible in ordinary
circumstances. Indirect performance can be used to enforce an act or
forbearance which is not interchangeable, 3 0 and would appear to depend on the
volition of the obligor, with the only remedy for non-performance being in
damages-and not via a contempt of court action. 3 '
A second remedy is ordinary damages, used in Japan as an alternative to
specific performance.' Both remedies can be used simultaneously.,33 A major
problem in the context of this article, however, is the inability to quantify the
extent of damages resulting, e.g., from breach of a vote-pooling agreement or
agreement regarding pre-emptive rights or restrictions on transferability of
shares. ,34
A third remedy, similar to our injunction, is a provisional disposition (kari
shobun). This remedy, found in the Code of Civil Procedure,' 35 can be used, for
example, when a party has sufficient advance knowledge that the other party
will take action in breach of a contractual provision, and it can be demonstrated
that contractual rights would be destroyed if the breach is allowed to take
place;'36 but it frequently may be difficult to obtain a timely injunction, the
injunction will not act against third parties, and an act performed in defiance
thereof is likely to be valid.' 3
A fourth remedy is rescission of the contract.3 8 This remedy, however, is not
likely to be useful in the context of a shareholder agreement, and probably can
be dismissed from consideration.
A fifth remedy, frequently considered the most useful, ' is a liquidated
damage or penalty clause setting in advance the amount of damages resulting
from a breach of contract. ' Despite the validity of these clauses where they
would not work under American law, in the present context, they do not lend
themselves to ready application. An all-purpose penalty or liquidated damages
"'Civil Code art. 414(2) & (3).
" SHArrUCK & KrTAGAWA, supra note 15, at 390; Code of Civil Procedure art. 734.
'Code of Civil Procedure art. 734; SHAT-rUCK& KrrAGAWA, supra note 15, at 387.
'Civil Code arts. 414(4) and 416; Kitagawa, Damages in Contracts for the Sale of Goods, 3 LAw
iJNWAN 43, 51-52 (1969).
'Civil Code art. 414(4).
"'Cf Henderson, supra note 2, at 493-94.
13'Code of Civil Procedure arts. 755-761.
"'See Code of Civil Procedure arts. 755, 758, and 760.
"'Concerning these difficulties, see, e.g., Henderson, supra note 2, at 494-95.
"'See Civil Code arts. 541-42.
"'See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 2, at 495.
"'°This remedy is specifically authorized by Civil Code art. 420.
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clause sufficient to fit the range of breaches of performance possible in a
shareholder agreement would be extremely difficult to fashion. Furthermore,
despite the Japanese law's receptivity to these kinds of clauses, the Japanese
courts can and do limit enforcement of them when they are considered excessive
under the circumstances. 1
In summary, even though many forms of shareholder agreements may be
valid, their effectiveness may leave much to be desired. Not only will an act done
in breach be considered valid, but the contract is only operative among and
between the actual parties. Furthermore, it will frequently be difficult to obtain
an effective remedy when the contract is breached or about to be breached. This
dilemma points out the need to include in the contract appropriate means for
settlement of the dispute which rely primarily upon other than lawsuit-based
remedies. Well-drafted clauses providing for arbitration, dissolution on the
happening of certain events, or other methods of this sort are more likely to
prove satisfactory over the long course. In addition, there is no substitute for the
willingness of both parties to understand the fears and preconceptions of the
other party at every step in the process of working together.
'See, e.g., Yamamura v. Kanzaki, 23 MiNsH6 147 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Nov. 14, 1944); Yokosuka
Kigyj K.K. v. Hayakawa Tekkd K.K., 9 K6"r5 MiNmsHO (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 28, 1956).
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